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Academic economists today are caught in a “Publication Impossibility Theorem System” or 
PITS. To further their careers, they are required to publish in A-journals, but this is 
impossible for the vast majority because there are few slots open in such journals. Such 
academic competition is held to provide the right incentives for hard work, but there may be 
serious negative consequences: the wrong output may be produced in an inefficient way, the 
wrong people may be selected, and the losers may react in a harmful way. The paper suggests 
several ways for improvement. 
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He is grateful for helpful remarks to readers of earlier versions, and for discussions with 
Charles Blankart, Reiner Eichenberger, Lars Feld, Gebhard Kirchgaessner, Simon 
Luechinger, Andrew Oswald, Katja Rost, and Alois Stutzer. The extensive conversations with 
Margit Osterloh were especially useful. 
The author predicts that this paper will be rejected by the journals to which it will be 
submitted. There may be two reasons: (1) The paper is “bad” and is therefore rightly rejected 
(causa finita); or (2) the paper goes so much against the conventional grain of thinking in 
economics that it is rejected for ideological reasons (“it just does not fit”). The author 
obviously believes in reason (2) but such judgment must, of course, be left to the readers. 
In order to shed some light on the publishing process, journal rejections will be explicitly 
listed in this first footnote. At the same time, the number of downloads on RePec and SSRN 
will be documented. The latter may serve as rough evidence for the interest sparked among 
scholars. The author is not aware having seen such a listing of these facts and figures in 
scholarly papers (it is only known that some subsequently famous papers were rejected by 
many journals before they were finally published – or perhaps not published; see Gans and 
Shepherd 1994). Papers are invariably presented as if they were in their virginal state. Many 
changes made voluntarily or involuntarily (the Publishing-as-Prostitution-effect, Frey 2003), 
are never revealed.  As most papers are rejected several times before acceptance, the actual 
contribution by the respective author remains unclear.  
An Impossibility 
Many economists feel that they work in the PITS. They are 
subjected to a publication system, which induces them to work 
extremely hard, but with only a minute chance of success. This 
applies in particular today to young scholars who, in many 
countries, know that they can only get a permanent position at a 
good university if they publish in an “A-journal”. A conventional 
definition of A-journals
i includes The American Economic Review, 
Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, and The Review of Economic Studies. Only when a 
young scholar has had at least one article, or preferably two or 
three, published in these journals, can he or she hope to get tenure 
or promotion to a full professorship. A full professor is expected to 
regularly have papers accepted in these A-journals or, otherwise, is 
considered to not be up to the task. These “publish in A-journals or 
perish” requirements are rarely explicitly written down
ii. That they 
do, in fact, exist is based on the author's recent conversations with 
both junior and senior scholars in Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom
iii. 
This paper argues that it is strictly impossible to meet this 
requirement because the number of scholars trying to achieve publication in A-journals is far larger than the number of slots 
open for publication. To borrow from a famous theory, one can 
(very loosely) speak of an “Impossibility Theorem” with respect to 
publishing requirements: For the population of aspiring academic 
economists, it is in general impossible to meet publishing 
requirements. Scholars can thus be taken to work in the PITS, i.e. 
in a “Publication Impossibility Theorem System”.  
 
 
Table 1 shows the number of slots, or the supply, available in A-
journals per year. 
                  











in the US 
American Economic Review 
a)  102  44 (43%)  84 (82%) 
Econometrica  51  18 (35%)  38 (75%) 
Journal of Political Economy  31  19 (61%)  25 (81%) 
Quarterly Journal of Economics  44  25 (57%)  37 (84%) 
Review of Economic Studies  47  13 (28%)  40 (85%) 
   275  119 (43%)  224 (81%) 
a) Papers and Proceedings are excluded.       
  
Table 1 shows that, in 2007 overall, 275 articles were published in A-
journals. More than 40% of that space was taken up by scholars from 
the top US universities (Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Yale, Berkeley, 
and Stanford), and more than 80% by scholars working in the United 
States. If this distribution holds in the future (and there is little reason 
to expect any drastic changes), an academic from any other country 
(of the more than 190) in the world can expect to compete for 
inclusion among the roughly 50 remaining slots.  
It is extremely difficult to estimate how large the demand is to 
publish in top economics journals. A rough estimate is that there are 
around 10,000 academics actively aspiring to publish in A-journals. 
The true figure is probably even larger as one single outlet, RePec, 
lists no less than 20,000 scholars presently involved in publishing. 
Even if two-thirds of them are from the United States, there are 
around 7,000 scholars from all other countries. However, it may 
safely be assumed that a considerable number are not listed in RePec, 
precisely because they have not yet been successful in publishing in 
one of the journals or other publication outlets included in RePec. 
What matters is that, by necessity, an extremely low share of aspiring 
scholars will be able to publish in an A-journal. Publication in these 
journals is characterized by extreme excess demand. 
 This is Just a Tournament 
The need to publish in A-journals can be interpreted as a tournament 
in which only one person or, in our case, a few people rise to the top, 
while the great majority of contenders fail to do so. Such a 
tournament (Rosen and Lazear 1981) is held to create the right 
incentives to put in lots of effort and do better than the other 
contenders. These are the beneficial effects of “publish or perish” 
which conventional economics has in mind. 
 
 
But There May Be Problems… 
In order for the tournament system reflected in the PITS to produce 
positive overall effects, four important requirements have to be 
fulfilled: 
1. The tournament leads to the “right” kind of output or scholarly 
production. 
The papers accepted in the A-journals must be exactly those 
desired according to some criterion. This criterion is defined 
within academia, in our case by the peer group of academic 
economists. Sociologists refer to such a criterion as “self-
referential”, as it is independent of any outside evaluation. A 
self-defined criterion could well be criticized by arguing that any discipline should cater to the interests of the wider public. 
This is particularly true of economics. Many people take it for 
granted that academic economists should help other people in 
society, in particular political and administrative decision-
makers, to better understand how the economy works and to 
improve its performance. While it is difficult to define exactly 
what this means, it is clear that such a goal is determined form 
outside the discipline. 
Even if the internal criterion by the academic economics 
profession was consistent with the external criterion described 
above – which can well be doubted
iv – it is still open to debate 
whether the members of the discipline are good at selecting the 
respective papers. The selection of papers relies on an elaborate 
system of peer reviews, which is taken to be the only reliable ex 
ante evaluation method. However, there is substantial empirical 
evidence that the peer-review process does not perform very 
well (see, extensively, Daniel 1993, Weingart 2005, Osterloh 
and Frey 2008, Gillies 2008). The inter-rater reliability is rather 
low (see e.g. Starbuck 2006); the evaluation of a paper by the 
various referees, on average, correlates only by 0.2 to 0.3, 
which is also rather low. Moreover, Oswald (2007) recently 
demonstrated that many papers published in B-journals get far 
more subsequent citations than many papers published in A-journals. As citations are considered the ultimate ex post 
evaluation in the profession, this evidence suggests that the 
present refereeing process is open to doubt. 
 
2. Publishing activity is efficient 
Even if the selection of articles for A-journals was perfect 
(which it never is nor will be), there is the question whether the 
social benefits produced by such a publication is worth the input 
of labor required. This is not necessarily the case, as the man-
hours needed to write an acceptable paper can be huge (some 
young scholars are said to have worked for one year or more to 
get a single paper into an A-journal), while the median number 
of citations is zero, or close to zero. According to Laband and 
Tollison (2003), for a sample of 73 journals in 1974 and 91 
journals in 1996, 26% of papers were never cited. One has to 
consider 70% of papers before the average per paper has been 
cited more than once. This can hardly be considered high 
productivity, as the “dry holes” are dominant by far. It may 
nevertheless be claimed that even if a large majority of 
publications in A-journals (and elsewhere) were indeed of little 
or no value, this production is necessary in order for a few gems 
to be produced. These gems only reveal themselves after some 
time, often a lengthy period. But this argument should be supported by empirical evidence and not just claimed. 
Otherwise, all activities a human being could undertake could 
be claimed to be highly productive. As it stands, it should be 
legitimate to at least ask whether the overall productivity of 
economists, from the point of view of society, would not be 
higher if they could more freely choose what and where they 
want to publish (for instance, in books and in the popular 
media), and whether publishing is the main, or only, activity in 
which they are obliged to engage. It should not be dismissed out 
of hand that economists would contribute more to society if the 
activity of a very large share of them were not “wasted” in the 
useless effort of writing papers for A-journals. A more efficient 
policy than “publish in A-journals or perish” could possibly be 
to induce scholars to first establish their mastery of economics 
by writing a number of papers devoted to the solution of 
concrete issues that, due to their lower formal elegance, are 
difficult or impossible to publish in the A-journals.  
 
3. The “right” people are selected 
A tournament among papers submitted to the A-journals only 
leads to a satisfactory selection of people in academia if writing 
top papers is the only relevant criterion. This is doubtful as 
academics have to fulfill various other important activities, i.e. they should be engaged in multiple tasks. The most important 
among these are: 
-  Teaching; 
-  Supporting young scholars (PhDs and postdoctoral students); 
-  Informing and advising the public; and, 
-  Participating in university administration. 
To excel in these tasks can, but does not necessarily, positively 
correlate with the ability to write A-journal papers, especially as 
performance in these other tasks is difficult and sometimes 
impossible to measure. As the need to publish in top journals is 
extremely arduous and time-consuming, due to the time-and-
effort constraints scholars are subject to, it is likely that a 
negative correlation between publishing and the four other tasks 
is generally produced (this is the multiple-task effect applied to 
academia, see Holmström and Milgrom 1991, Prendergast 
1999). Imposing strict requirements for publishing in A-journals 
also tends to lead to an undesirable selection effect among 
participants, as intrinsically motivated scholars are likely to be 
put off while extrinsically motivated scholars thrive (this is the 
crowding-out effect, see Frey 1997, Bénabou and Tirole 2003). 
The fact that there are always some extremely gifted and 
extrinsically motivated scholars who excel in several of these tasks simultaneously is not a valid counterargument. One 
should also consider the less-gifted ones for whom the 
requirement to publish in A-journals takes away a very large 
amount of time and effort from other tasks. Moreover, it is 
difficult to imagine a well-functioning department composed of 
A-journal publishing scholars only. A balanced mixture of 
various capabilities is more likely to work successfully; in 
particular, it allows the most gifted scholars to have the room to 
flourish.  
 
4. The reaction of the losers is not harmful.  
The cost of the PITS depends much on how scholars unable to 
publish in A-journals react and what their options are. Some 
people who have lost in the tournament keep on trying to 
publish in A-journals. But it is unrealistic to assume that they 
will do so over an extended period. Most of them are realistic 
enough to realize sooner or later that they will not make it. They 
may resort to several different kinds of behavior: 
-  They can try to publish in lower ranked journals knowing 
that they will not attain any satisfactory position at a good 
university. The question is whether such lesser careers exist 
in a particular university system. If the strict “publish in A-
journals or perish” requirement continues, such lesser careers do not exist and these people will have to leave and work 
outside academia.  
-   The “losers” decide to give up their plan to stay in the 
university system and exit the profession. This selection 
effect is beneficial if the above conditions fully hold. 
Otherwise, the strict requirement to publish in A-journals 
leads to an unwanted adverse selection of scholars able to 
write the necessary A-papers, but who turn out to be of little 
use or even outright failures with respect to other university 
tasks. An exit to activities outside the university may also be 
socially beneficial if the effort to publish in A-journals 
helped them to be better trained in other occupations. This 
may be, but need not be, the case
v because the writing of 
papers for A-journals is an extremely specialized activity: a 
necessary requirement is to follow the self-defined criterion 
the economics profession happens to have in a particular 
period, but which outsiders do not necessarily share. This 
refers to the specific way Americans write scientific works
vi, 
to the language, and especially to the techniques of analysis 
used. An example is the current extreme focus on the 
“identification” problem in econometric analysis, i.e. the 
need to clearly establish often opposing causal relationships. 
In many cases, discussions in academic seminars, and the decision to reject a paper in a journal, is reduced to this issue, 
essentially neglecting all other, possibly important, aspects. It 
sometimes seems that the content of a contribution has 
become more or less irrelevant, and the only thing that really 
counts is technical dexterity. To give a concrete case: “Does 
marriage make people happy or do happy people get 
married?” Whenever I discuss this question in my speeches 
to lay audiences, I am forced to note, to my surprise, that 
they are little interested in it. Lay people say: “Of course, 
both are true” (and this is, in fact, the outcome of the 
respective research in the economics of happiness, see 
Stutzer and Frey 2006, Frey 2008, chapter 8). An economist 
who shares this view with the public and wants to 
concentrate on issues of content, finds it nearly impossible in 
current conditions to publish in an A-journal. He or she will 
then be lost for the profession. But the public may well be 
right to some extent: the direction of causation is crucial if 
one wants to suggest a policy intervention, but possibly not 
otherwise. Explicit policy proposals, however, are not 
exactly the stuff normally published in A-journals.  
-  The “losers” stay on as long as they can in their university 
job (which in some European countries means for many 
years, if not for life). They may well be psychically depressed, even showing signs of mental disorder. Others 
will become aggressive and obstruct the work of those 
scholars who hope to meet the publication requirements (see 
Lazear 1995 on sabotage). A mild form of such behavior is to 
write negative or even devastating referee reports for 
professional journals. Circumstantial evidence suggests
vii that 
such negative attitudes have become more common than they 
used to be in the past, reflecting the increasingly strict 
publication pressure. 
It may be retorted that the view that losers of A-journal 
tournaments are psychologically depressed is too negative. 
Indeed, Stouffer et al. (1949, Studies in Social Psychology in 
World War II: The American Soldier. Vol. 1-4) found that 
such negative psychic reactions arise only when promotion is 
taken to be the rule. In that case, those not promoted feel 
unhappy because they realize that they are clearly worse than 
most of their colleagues. In contrast, when the promotion 
possibilities are limited, the “losers” do not judge that they 
are worse than most of their companions. The reaction thus 
depends much on the perception of the participants in the 
tournament. The more firmly the “publish in A-journals or 
perish” principle is taken to be the rule, the more depressed the losers become and the more negatively they affect the 
academic system. 
Depending on what type of reaction prevails, the A-journal 
publication tournament may lead to positive or negative 
consequences overall. The present system of focusing scholars on 
publishing in top journals only, and disqualifying all other 
publication outlets, may have negative consequences in various 
respects.   
 
An Open Issue 
If the analysis above is correct, it is undecided whether the PITS is 
socially beneficial or not. At the minimum, it should not be taken for 
granted (as is generally done today) that the PITS is a good, or even 
the best, way to organize academia. Before such a conclusion is 
drawn, a serious discussion of the possible negative effects is in 
order, and much more empirical evidence is needed. The evaluation 
should not be confined to considering the effects on (internally 
defined) “scientific excellence”, but should also consider the possible 
negative aspects: imperfect and biased selection of papers and of 
scholars, effects on other economic activities and on those scholars 
not successful in the tournament. Moreover, the present system of the 
A-journal publication requirement should be compared to alternative 
ways of organizing science:  -  One possibility would be to solve the multiple-tasking 
problem by making an effort to measure all aspects 
important for an academic career: teaching, supporting 
younger scholars, linking up to the public, and participating 
in academic administration. While this first option seems 
straightforward, it is not to be recommended. It would lead to 
an enormous amount of evaluation, and scholars would 
invariably find ways to “beat the system”.  
-  A quite different, and even contrary, option is to resort to an 
overall evaluation of young scholars based on the intuitive 
knowledge of seasoned scholars. Such a procedure seems to 
be “unscientific” because it is not based on a detailed 
measurement and analysis of the multiple tasks to be 
performed by an academic. However, such a view is too 
simple. According to recent psychological research, “gut 
feelings” are often superior to in-depth analyses (Gigerenzer 
2007, 2002, popularized by Gladwell 2005). Indeed, many 
established scholars proceed in this way when they exchange 
their views about younger scholars. What matters to them is 
indeed the gut feeling, and not whether someone has 
published a paper in a particular A-journal. Publications are 
likely to follow because such intuitive judgments often prove 
to be correct. Using the intuitive knowledge of seasoned scholars has, of 
course, its own disadvantages. While some consensus on 
who such scholars are seems to be possible, it cannot be 
predicted what persons they will choose. This introduces a 
measure of uncertainty for young scholars and gives them 
incentives to personally please the seasoned scholars. 
Personality and friendship may matter more than research 
because gut feelings are likely to be influenced by such 
concerns. On the other hand, these claimed disadvantages 
should not be overrated. Seasoned scholars are well aware of 
them and, in order to maintain their reputation in the field, 
make an effort to be as objective as possible.  
-  A third possibility is to restrict the PITS to the early phase of 
a scientific career. Scholars must learn the tools of the trade 
and must show that they are able to use them with profit. 
Thereafter, one should let scholars proceed as they see fit for 
themselves (see more fully Osterloh and Frey 2008)
viii. This 
allows them to exhibit their intrinsic motivation in scientific 
research at least for the remaining part of the career. An 
obvious disadvantage is that scholars in later phases of their 
careers are not subjected to any external monitoring and may 
no longer engage themselves in research. This may well be so but an academic system should be designed to enable the 
best rather than to prevent the worst
ix. 
-  Yet another possibility would be to more openly shape 
several levels of scientific careers. In particular, there should 
be careers at universities and research institutes for which it 
is sufficient to have published in one or several of the 
hundreds of other general and specialized journals, but also 
in the form of books and internet publications, as well as 
participation in current public debates (i.e. acting as a “public 
intellectual”, see Posner 2002). To require each and every 
scholar to aspire to publish in A-journals is likely to be a 
flawed policy. Unfortunately, in several European countries 
(notably in Germany and Switzerland) professors in applied 
universities (formerly called Fachhochschulen) are now 
required to engage in advanced research and to publish at the 
same level and with the same intensity as their colleagues at 
scientific universities. 
Each of these (and possibly other) options has its advantages and 
disadvantages. This paper has tried to call attention to the grave 
failures of the present system of “publish in A-journals or perish”, 
and to point out that there are viable alternatives to be openly 
discussed.             (February 25
th, 2009;  3’242 words) 
 
 
                                                 
i   See e.g. Leek 2006 for various definitions and the corresponding literature. 
ii   Faculties of economics at numerous universities (e.g. the University of Linz in 
Austria), as well as economics associations (e.g. the Verein fuer Socialpolitik, the association 
of economists in Germany, Austria and Switzerland), have an official list in which they 
assign points for publishing in A-, B-, C- etc journals. Typically, a publication in one of the 
A-journals listed above gives three times as many points as a B-journal publication. There 
are also universities that explicitly offer a sum of money for journal publishing. The 
University of Economics and Business Administration in Vienna, for example, pays authors 
3,000 Euros for publication in what they define as an A+-journal (which, in economics, 
include the five journals in the text above, as well as six more), and 1,000 Euros for 
publication in an A-journal, i.e. a top publication is defined to be worth three times as much 
as a second-rate one (http://wu-wien.ac.at/forschung.praemie). Other universities do not 
consider journal publications lower than A at all. Rumour has it that in some academic 
settings (I heard this in Stockholm), it has a negative effect if one publishes in B, C, or other 
lower ranked journals.  
iii   As always, it is difficult to state whether, and to what extent, this and the following 
arguments apply to the United States academic system because it is characterized by such a 
wide variety: The top universities are very different from minor institutions which also call 
themselves universities. 
  Another question is to what extent the observations and suggestions discussed here 
also apply to disciplines outside economics. While they can certainly not be directly 
transferred, there are indications that many aspects are also relevant elsewhere, see e.g. the 
discussion by Hewstone and Stroebe (2008) on social psychology.  
iv   See the charges of  “autism” made against standard economics from many quarters. 
The movement, which started in the Grandes Ecoles in France and led to an on-line journal, 
Post-Autistic Economics Review, is well known. 
v   It can be argued that an economist who manages to publish one or two papers in an 
A-journal is often worse than somebody who engages in broader academic activities, and 
who has published papers in respectable, but not top, journals. The former has devoted all 
effort to writing papers acceptable to the referees of the top journals, but otherwise is not 
well trained for the other academic tasks. (I owe this point to Reiner Eichenberger) 
vi   French or German scholars traditionally developed their ideas in a way which differs 
fundamentally from the way, Americans do it today. But it should not be forgotten that this 
kind of writing was used by some of the most original and best scholars in the discipline. 
vii   This is a personal impression not shared by everyone. It is based on roughly 400 
publications by the present author in professional journals (in economics, including A-                                                                                                                                                       
journals, management, political science, sociology, psychology, and law) between 1965 and 
2008, as well as, of course, on many hundreds of rejections. 
viii The academic system in some countries works in this way: full professors in particular are 
not required to show that they continue to publish  (or not). To the extent this is the case, the 
second suggestion has already been realized.  
ix It should be kept in mind that no system is able to exclude persons who do not perform 
well after having entered it. The relevant question is how large their share is, and how badly 
they affect the system. In the case of academia the damage is not so large because such 
people normally decide to engage more in teaching and in administrative tasks. This helps 
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